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1. Introduction 
 
The empirical growth literature has generated a long list of regressors assumed to 
affect economic growth. The regressors range from schooling to climate and from 
the extent of democracy to life expectancy (see e.g. Bleaney and Nishiyama, 
2002). These factors are of considerable importance and it is for example unlikely 
to find a non-democratic country with an extreme climate to show fast economic 
growth, except when oil or other natural resources come into play. However, little 
attention in the empirical growth literature has been devoted to entrepreneurship 
and competition usually considered vital to economic progress. The lack of eco-
nomic progress in (formerly) centralized planned economies has been at least 
partly due to the absence of these private initiatives. A characteristic of these 
economies was the almost complete absence of small firms and this extreme mo-
nopolization was a major factor leading to the collapse of state socialism (see e.g. 
Ellman, 1993 and Acs, 1996). The incorporation of entrepreneurship and competi-
tion into empirical growth models has been hampered by the problem of measure-
ment. However, a small literature has developed that investigates the effect of the 
industry structure in terms of the share of small firms on economic progress. Ex-
amples include Nickell (1996), Carree and Thurik (1998), Audretsch et al. (2002) 
and Carree (2002a).  
Recently, Carree et al. (2002) introduced a model that describes the interrelation-
ship between the rate of business ownership (or interchangeably self-employment) 
and economic development. This model consists of two equations, which are esti-
mated successively. In the first equation, an “equilibrium” relation is derived be-
tween the rate of business ownership and the level of economic development of a 
country. In the second equation the impact on economic growth of deviating from 
the “equilibrium” rate is estimated. The basic idea behind the model is that there 
can be too many or too few self-employed in an economy. A consequence of a too 
high business ownership rate in a country is that economies of scale and scope 
are not benefited from and that R&D expenditures may be relatively low. A conse-
quence of a too low business ownership rate is that new private initiatives and 
radical new innovations may be less present than in other countries at comparable 
levels of economic development. Carree et al. present empirical evidence for the 
“equilibrium” rate of business ownership to depend upon the stage of economic 
development and that deviating from the “equilibrium” implies a lower economic 
growth rate.  
The paper by Carree et al. suffers from an important limitation. It studies the rela-
tionship between business ownership rates at the economy-wide level without tak-
ing into consideration the sectoral structure of the economy. It is well-known that 
business ownership rates are much higher in the service sector when compared to 
the manufacturing sector. It is therefore possible that the penalty on deviating from 
the “equilibrium” business ownership rate is not a problem of having too few or too 
many self-employed, but a problem of having a too small or a too large share of 
the service sector. Carree et al. find that the “equilibrium” business ownership 
rates tend to increase with the level of economic development for the highly most 
developed countries (in terms of GDP per capita). This might be caused by in-
creased interest for the option of self-employment as such across the sectors in 
the economy, but may also be explained from an employment shift in modern 
economies away from the manufacturing sector towards the service sector. The 
current paper examines the importance of the sectoral component in the Carree et 5 
al. model, using data for 21 OECD countries. The 21 countries include 16 Euro-
pean countries, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. 
There is a lot of debate about the reasons behind the increase in self-employment 
rates in developed countries in the last quarter of the 20
th century. On the one 
hand, Audretsch and Thurik (2000) consider it to be a reflection of the shift from a 
“managed” towards an “entrepreneurial” economy. They claim that there is more 
room for business ownership in the latter type of economy because of, among oth-
ers, increasing variety of demand and rapidly changing economic circumstances in 
which small firms have a comparative advantage with regard to their larger coun-
terparts. These phenomena particularly apply to fully industrialized economies and 
therefore, this upward trend of business ownership would only be observable in 
countries at higher stages of economic development. On the other hand, other 
economists will say that this upward trend of the macro business ownership rate in 
modern economies is just a reflection of the (employment) share of the service in-
dustries increasing at the cost of the manufacturing industries’ share. According to 
these economists it does not imply that also within sectors there would be an up-
ward trend in business ownership. The current analysis gathers business owner-
ship data on the sectoral level and applies the model of Carree et al. at this level. 
In this way, we can determine whether or not the structural changes in business 
ownership do also apply within sectors. In particular, we will estimate the model for 
two sectors: manufacturing and services. 
In section 2 we will discuss the Carree et al. model and adapt it to make it applica-
ble at the sectoral level. We also discuss the relevant literature. In section 3 we 
discuss the data for the OECD countries. This is followed by the empirical results 
in section 4. Section 5 is left for discussion.   
 
 
2. Theory and model 
 
Carree et al. (2000, 2002) introduced a model consisting of two equations with one 
additional equation defining the “equilibrium” rate of business ownership in period 
t, 
*
t E . The dependent variables of the two equations are the four-year change in 
the business ownership rate,  4 − − t t E E , and the four-year growth rate of GDP, 
4 4 − − − t t t Y / ) Y Y ( . We use the same model configuration in our analysis but adapt it 
somewhat to apply it to the sectoral level. The model reads as follows. 
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The symbols in these equations stand for the following variables: 
 
E :  number of business owners as fraction of total employment in sector (sec-
toral business ownership rate), 
* E :  sectoral equilibrium business ownership rate, 
Y : sectoral  GDP, 
YCAP: GDP per capita (macro level), 
U : unemployment  rate, 
U :  sample average of unemployment rate, 
share Y _ :  sectoral GDP as fraction of total GDP, 
o
WT :  relative growth of world trade (yearly basis), 
ITA D :  dummy for Italy, 
OMIB D : dummy for countries for which number of business owners is defined inclu-
sive of owner/managers of incorporated businesses (OMIBs), 
2 1,ε ε : disturbance terms in equations (1) and (2), respectively, 
t j i , , :  indices for country, sector, and year, respectively. 
 
The variables E , 
* E  and Y  are defined at the sectoral level and YCAP and U  are 
defined at the macro level. In the current paper business ownership is defined to 
include both the self-employed (the unincorporated as well as the incorporated) 
and the unpaid family workers. More details about this definition and the data 
sources used are given in section 3. In the remainder of the current section we will 
describe the three equations in the model in some detail. A more elaborate discus-
sion can be found in Carree et al. (2002). Because the concept of an “equilibrium” 
rate of business ownership is central to the model, we start with equation (3). 
 
Equilibrium business ownership equation (3) 
The (sectoral) equilibrium business ownership rate is assumed to be a function  f  
of (macro) economic development as measured by  it YCAP . For low levels of eco-
nomic development, we expect the function  f  to be declining. Several authors 
(e.g. Kuznets 1971, Schultz 1990) have reported a negative relationship between 
economic development and the business ownership (self-employment) rate. Their 
studies use a large cross-section of countries with a wide variety in the stage of 
economic development. There are a series of reasons for the decline of self-
employment, and of small business presence in general, during the early phases of 
industrialization. Chandler (1990) discusses the importance of investment in pro-
duction, distribution, and management needed to exploit economies of scale and 
scope during the period after the second industrial revolution of the second half of 
the 19th century. It was a period of relatively well-defined technological trajecto-
ries, of stable demand and of seemingly clear advantages of diversification. 
For high levels of economic development the function  f  may be increasing. Acs et 
al. (1994) report that a majority of OECD-countries experienced an increase in the 
self-employment rate during the 1970s and 1980s. Further evidence of a recent 
increase in self-employment in many OECD countries appears from EIM’s data set 
COMPENDIA. For instance, for the United Kingdom, the number of non-agricultural 
self-employed (including the incorporated self-employed) as a fraction of total la-
bour force increased from 7.8% in 1972 to 10.5% in 2000, and in the United States 7 
this fraction increased from 8.0% to 10.0% in the same period (see Van Stel, 
2003). 
There are several reasons for the revival of small business and self-employment in 
Western economies. First, the last thirty years can be considered a period of indus-
trial restructuring away from traditional manufacturing industries and towards the 
electronics, software and biotechnology industries. Jensen (1993) uses the term 
“Third Industrial Revolution” to describe this development. Small firms play an im-
portant role in these new industries. Second, new technologies have reduced the 
importance of scale economies in many sectors. This increases the comparative 
advantage of small firms relative to large firms (see e.g. Meredith, 1987). Third, 
from a certain level of economic development onwards, higher income and wealth 
increase consumer demand for variety (see Jackson 1984) creating new market 
niches. Fourth, self-employment has become more highly valued as an occupa-
tional choice. This “supply side” reason may be derived from a supposed hierarchy 
of human motivations, ranging from physical needs at the bottom to self-realization 
at the top (Maslow, 1970). Once the main material needs have been satisfied, a 
still higher level of prosperity will induce a growing need for self-realization. Be-
cause it provides more autonomy and independence, entrepreneurship then be-
comes more highly valued as an occupational choice than at lower income levels. 
Based on these trends in self-employment (business ownership), we expect the 
equilibrium relation to be U-shaped (first declining and then rising business owner-
ship rates). However, we will also consider L-shaped relationships (ownership 
rates continuously declining towards an asymptotic minimum rate).
1 We have cho-
sen a parametric approach and have used four different equilibrium functions, two 
of which are U-shaped and two of which are L-shaped. These are given in equa-
tions (3a) through (3d). For ease of presentation we do not show the correction 
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The equilibrium rate of business ownership equals α  when GDP per capita (YCAP) 
is zero in each of the four equations (3a) through (3d). In equation (3a) the relation 
between the level of development and the equilibrium rate of business ownership 
is quadratic. We expect β  to be negative as initially economic development is 
negatively correlated with the business ownership rate. This decline is expected to 
become smaller over time, so γ  is expected to be positive. The minimum of the U-
shaped curve is reached for GDP per capita equal to  γ β 2 / − . Another U-shaped 
relation can be found in equation (3c). Again we expect  β  to be negative and γ  to 
be positive. In this log-quadratic case the rise of the curve after the minimum has 
                                                         
1  Carree et al. (2002) concluded that U-shaped functions cannot be statistically discriminated from L-
shaped functions.
  8 
been reached is less steep than the decline beforehand. Equations (3b) and (3d) 
give L-shaped equilibrium relations. The equilibrium rate is predicted to decline 
from α  to  β α −  as the level of economic development rises from zero to high lev-
els. We call this equilibrium relation the inverse and log-inverse cases. We com-
pare the four different equilibrium functions on the basis of the explanatory powers 
in equations (1) and (2). That is, we compare the extent to which the change in the 
rate of entrepreneurship and the sectoral growth rate can be explained from devia-
tions of the actual business ownership rate from the equilibrium business owner-
ship rate. 
The functional form of YCAP in equation (3) is multiplied by a factor  ) 1 ( OMIB OMIB D b + . 
This correction is necessary because the self-employment definitions in our data 
set vary across countries. In section 3 we will go into detail about these differences 
in definition. Summarized, one group of countries have self-employed defined as 
individuals inclusive of owner/managers of incorporated businesses (OMIBs) and 
other countries have a definition exclusive of OMIBs. It is clear that this creates an 
upward bias for the first group of countries as regards the number of self-
employed. As these differences in definition are likely to (erroneously) affect the 
estimated equilibrium functions, we apply the raise-factor  ) 1 ( OMIB OMIB D b + . The im-
plicit assumption is that for a given sector the number of OMIBs as a fraction of the 
total number of business owners is constant for all levels of economic develop-
ment. Obviously, the estimated  OMIB b  should be positive. 
 
Business ownership equation (1) 
The dependent variable in equation (1) is the growth in the fraction of business 
owners (self-employed and unpaid family workers) in total sector employment in a 
period of four years. The first explanatory variable in the equation, which has the 
parameter  1 b  assigned to it, is an error correction variable describing the difference 
between the equilibrium and the actual rate of business ownership (at sector level) 
at the start of the period. The parameter  1 b  is expected to have a positive sign. 
There are several forces in market economies that may contribute to a process of 
adapting towards the equilibrium. An abundance of self-employed will lead to low 
profits and lack of desire to continue family business given that the government 
does not provide extraordinary support measures to self-employed. A relative 
shortage of self-employed may indicate entrepreneurial opportunities that will lead 
to high (net) entry rates given that the government regulations do not result in high 
barriers to potential entrepreneurs. The existence of a sound entrepreneurial cli-
mate and a well-developed (venture) capital market are instrumental in this re-
spect.  
The  second explanatory variable is the lagged unemployment rate acting as a 
push factor for business ownership.
2 The expected sign of the parameter  2 b  is 
positive. The third explanatory variable is the sectoral share in GDP. It is likely that 
scale advantages rank as an important competitive advantage in a sector in case 
the sectoral share in an economy is relatively high. Opportunities for new small 
ventures may be less present in later stages of the life cycle of industries in which 
                                                         
2 The empirical evidence on the effect of unemployment on business formation is mixed. Evans and 
Leighton (1989) present evidence that unemployed workers are more likely to enter self-employment than 
employees. Carree (2002b) finds no effect of unemployment rates on the number of establishment in low 
entry barrier retail and consumer service industries.  9 
scale economies in production or R&D have become key sources of competitive 
strength (see e.g. Klepper, 1996). Hence, the expected sign of parameter  3 b  is 
negative. Finally, we follow Carree et al. in incorporating a dummy for Italy. Italy, 
especially Northern Italy, is exceptional in the sense that a relatively high value of 
GDP per capita is combined with a high and rising self-employment rate.
3  
 
Economic growth equation (2) 
The dependent variable in equation (2) is sectoral economic growth, measured as 
the relative change in sectoral gross domestic product in a four-year period. The 
first determinant of sectoral growth is the (absolute) deviation of the actual rate of 
business ownership from the equilibrium rate of business ownership at the start of 
the period. The deviation is expected to have a negative impact on growth, or 
0 1 < c . A shortage of business owners is likely to diminish competition with detri-
mental effects for static efficiency and competitiveness of the national economy. It 
will also diminish variety, learning and selection and thereby harm dynamic effi-
ciency (innovation). On the other hand, a glut of self-employment will cause the 
average scale of operations to remain below optimum. It will result in large num-
bers of marginal entrepreneurs, absorbing capital and human energy that could 
have been allocated more productively elsewhere. 
The second determinant is the (economy-wide) level of per capita income at the 
start of the period. It allows us to correct for the convergence hypothesis of coun-
tries. Countries lagging behind in economic development may show faster eco-
nomic growth than more highly developed countries because they can profit from 
modern technologies developed in these countries. The expected sign of the pa-
rameter  2 c  is negative. Similarly, we include the sectoral share of GDP to capture 
regression-to-the-mean effects at a sectoral level. Countries in which a certain sec-
tor is already quite large are expected to be confronted with less sectoral output 
growth than countries in which a sector has a smaller share of the economy. The 
parameter  3 c  is also expected to be negative. The fourth determinant is (current 
and lagged) growth of world trade. Value added growth of exporting firms is de-
pendent on the developments in world trade. The hypothesized effect of growth of 
world trade is positive, or  0 6 5 4 > c , c , c . This holds especially for manufacturing as 





In this section we deal with the data used in the current paper. The section is split 
up in two parts. First, we discuss the sectoral classification and the required sec-
toral variables number of business owners, total employment and real value 
added. Second, we provide an overview of definitions and sources for the vari-
ables, either at the sectoral level or at the macro level. 
                                                         
3 We do not include dummies for all countries in the sample. An implication of such a specification is that 
every country has its own unique equilibrium level. However, this type of country-specific equilibrium lev-
els is not the focus of this study, since we are investigating a “universal” equilibrium function which should 
be valid for all countries. Also, deviations from country-specific equilibrium levels have quite a different 
interpretation than deviations from a “universal” equilibrium level, as the former type of deviation ignores 
the cross-country variation in business ownership rates. 10 
 
3.1 Sectoral  data 
 
We estimate the model for the two main private sectors in a modern economy: 
manufacturing and services. For these sectors we need data on the number of 
business owners, total employment and real value added. We have collected these 
variables for 21 OECD countries for the years 1970-1998, as far as the data were 
available according to uniform definitions. This has resulted in the so-called “BLISS 
Oeso Sectoraal” data set, which is operated by EIM. The main data source for 
“BLISS Oeso Sectoraal” is OECD National Accounts 1983-1995, Detailed Tables. 
Where possible, missing data are supplied from other sources. Below we describe 
the sector classification used in the data set and describe the above-mentioned 
variables in some more detail. 
 
Sectoral classification 
The sector manufacturing is a one-digit industry in OECD National Accounts. For 
services four one-digit industries in the OECD National Accounts have been ag-
gregated: (1) Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels; (2) Transport, 
storage and communication; (3) Finance, insurance, real estate and business ser-
vices; (4) Community, social and personal services. We realise that our definition 
of the service sector is very broad. The four underlying sectors may be substan-
tially different in structure, so ideally we would want to distinguish between these 
sectors. However, the composition of these four underlying sectors is quite differ-
ent for different countries, visible in the numerous country notes on this matter to 
the statistical tables in the OECD National Accounts.
4 Hence, we cannot compare 
the numbers of business owners in the four underlying service sectors between dif-
ferent countries. These differences in composition do not apply to the aggregate 
data of the four underlying sectors. Therefore, despite its limitations, we prefer to 
work with the broad definition of the service sector.
5 
 
3.1.1  Number of business owners 
 
Collecting harmonized data on the number of business owners at sectoral level for 
a large number of countries and over a long period of time is not easy for at least 
three reasons.
6 First, business owners (self-employed) are not defined uniformly 
across countries. In some countries owner/managers of incorporated businesses 
(OMIBs) are counted as self-employed whereas in other countries they are 
                                                         
4 For example, for a number of countries the sub-sector Business services, which is part of sector Fi-
nance, etc., is included in Community, social and personal services, see OECD (1997a), pp. 100, 212, 
351, 368 and 600. For some countries the sub-sector Restaurants and hotels, which is part of Wholesale, 
etc., is included in Community, social and personal services, see OECD (1997a), pp. 100, 148 and 368. 
For Italy, a distinction between Finance, etc., and Community, social and personal services has not even 
been made in the statistical tables of OECD National Accounts. Only aggregate data of these two sectors 
are included in the tables, see OECD (1997a), p. 431. 
5 A similar problem applies to the one-digit manufacturing sector. In some countries the one-digit sector 
mining is included in the manufacturing sector. In prevailing cases, we did correct for it with help of data 
from the Labour Force Statistics. Also, with help of data from other sources, we made a correction in the 
GDP data for manufacturing to exclude the mining part in these figures. 
6 Measurement problems concerning comparability of new firm formation rates across seven economically 
advanced countries are identified in a special issue of Regional Studies, see Reynolds et al. (1994). 11 
counted as employee. This is because formally an owner/manager of an incorpo-
rated business is an employee of his own firm. The different statistical treatment 
results from a different set-up of labor force surveys in different countries.
7 Second, 
the big interest for entrepreneurship dates only from recent times. This is the rea-
son that consistent measuring of the self-employed also dates from recent times. 
For some countries reliable data on the number of self-employed are not available, 
especially for early years and at a sectoral level. Third, and directly related to the 
second problem, in some countries major revisions in the way of measuring the 
self-employed have taken place in the past. Hence, for these countries numbers of 
self-employed are not readily comparable over time.  
From the description above it becomes clear that we cannot measure the number 
of self-employed in a uniform fashion for all the 21 countries and for all years in our 
sample period. Instead, we have made definitions as uniform as possible and work 
with an unbalanced panel.
8 We end up with two groups of countries, using different 
self-employment definitions. This is explained below.  
 
Three types of self-employed 
Based on legal status, self-employed individuals may be split up in three different 
types: unincorporated self-employed, incorporated self-employed, and unpaid fam-
ily workers. For each group we have to decide whether or not we want to include 
them in our self-employment definition. The most common group of self-employed 
individuals are the unincorporated self-employed and this group is obviously in-
cluded in our self-employment count. We also want to include the incorporated 
self-employed in our count because they are not fundamentally different from the 
unincorporated self-employed, as far as “entrepreneurial spirit” is involved: both 
types of self-employed have chosen to “be their own boss”. However, as men-
tioned earlier, in some countries the incorporated self-employed are treated as 
employee in the statistical tables, and for those countries it is not possible to 
measure their numbers. Because we include the incorporated self-employed in our 
definition, we generally speak of ‘business owners’ throughout this paper (in order 
to distinguish from ‘self-employed’ which is often understood to include only the 
unincorporated self-employed).  
As far as unpaid family workers are concerned, we would rather not include them 
in our self-employment count. Family workers who work in a family member’s firm 
often have little influence on the ‘entrepreneurial’ decisions taken. Usually they 
would not start a business in case this family member would not run one already. 
Therefore, we would have liked not to include them in our count of self-employed. 
However, although there is information at the macro level about the proportions of 
unpaid family workers in total self-employed in various countries (see the various 
issues of the OECD Labour Force Statistics)
9, there is no information about these 
proportions at the sectoral level. Because sectoral self-employment data in OECD 
National Accounts are inclusive of unpaid family workers and we cannot (in a plau-
                                                         
7 See Chapter 5 of OECD Employment Outlook June 2000. 
8 This means that the data are not available for the same period of time for all countries and sectors. In-
stead we work with the maximum amount of data that we were able to collect for each country and sector. 
9 In earlier studies that we performed at the macro level, we have in fact used self-employment data ex-
clusive of unpaid family workers (Carree et al. 2000 and 2002). These studies make use of EIM’s data set 
COMPENDIA, see Van Stel (2003). 12 
sible way) exclude the unpaid family workers from the available figures, we were 
left no choice but to include them in our self-employment count. 
 
Definitions 
As mentioned earlier, the way in which the self-employed are defined in OECD Na-
tional Accounts is different across countries. Specifically, in some countries the 
owner/managers of incorporated businesses are counted as self-employed and in 
other countries they are counted as employee. We do not correct for the difference 
in definitions in our data, as we do not dispose of country- and sector-specific in-
formation about the proportions incorporated/unincorporated self-employed. In-
stead, we correct for the differences in our model, by means of a so-called OMIB-
dummy.  
For the construction of the OMIB-dummy, we must know which countries use the 
narrow definition of self-employed (excluding the incorporated self-employed), and 
which countries use the broader one (including the incorporated self-employed). In 
OECD Employment Outlook June 2000, the countries that use the narrow definition 
and the ones that use the broad definition are given. That is, the definitions as ap-
plied in OECD Labour Force Statistics are mentioned. In principle, the definition 
used in LFS is also the definition used in OECD National Accounts. But this is not 
necessarily true for all countries. Based on (1) a comparison between the total 
number of non-agricultural self-employed (including unpaid family workers) accord-
ing to OECD Labour Force Statistics and OECD National Accounts; (2) the defini-
tion used in each country in OECD Labour Force Statistics as reported by OECD 
Employment Outlook June 2000, p. 158; (3) the country-notes in OECD National 
Accounts 1983-1995; we have been able to distinguish two groups of countries in 
our dataset: countries using a broad self-employment definition (including OMIBs) 
and countries using a narrow definition (excluding OMIBs). The countries having a 
self-employment definition including OMIBs are Belgium, Denmark, France, West-
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, United States 
and New Zealand. The countries having a self-employment definition excluding 
OMIBs are Austria, Finland, Netherlands, Sweden, Iceland, Norway, Japan, Can-
ada and Australia. In terms of equation (3), the value of  OMIB D  is 1 for the first 
group of countries and 0 for the second group.
10  
 
Supplementary sources and corrections 
As mentioned earlier, the main source for the sectoral data is OECD National Ac-
counts 1983-1995.
11 The number of self-employed (in persons) is derived from 
country tables 15: employment by kind of activity, as the difference between em-
ployment of all persons and employment of employees. Where possible, missing 
                                                         
10
 Two remarks concerning the United States are required here. First, the definition in OECD National Ac-
counts for the U.S. is exclusive of OMIBs. Instead of using these data and classifying the U.S. in the sec-
ond group of countries (i.e., excluding OMIBs), we made an exception for the U.S. and made an approxi-
mation of the number of OMIBs based on information from The State of Small Business. The exception 
was made because we would like to include the number of OMIBs in our definition and we consider the 
U.S. too important to settle for a definition excluding OMIBs in our data set. Second, the United States is 
also exceptional in the sense that the self-employment data from OECD National Accounts are exclusive 
of unpaid family workers, see OECD (1997a), p. 73. Since in the U.S. the number of unpaid family work-
ers is very low (0.1% of total non-agricultural employment in 1996; compare this with, for example 4.1% in 
Turkey, see OECD, 1997b), this discrepancy in definition with regard to the other countries is very small. 
11 This publication also provides data for years prior to 1983, by means of accompanying disks. 13 
data (including the years 1996-98) are supplied from various other sources, includ-
ing OECD Labour Force Statistics and OECD National Accounts 1988-98. Correc-
tions are made to ensure that data from different sources correspond. In some 
cases country-specific data sources are used to make data comparable with other 
countries. For example, in OECD National Accounts the data for the Netherlands 
are expressed in man-years instead of persons. Therefore, we used information 
from the Dutch national accounts (published by Statistics Netherlands), to obtain a 
time series in persons. Also, for the United States, we constructed a series inclu-
sive of OMIBs, making use of information from The State of Small Business, issues 
1986 and 1996. 
Sectoral business ownership data are reported in Table 1. Greece and Italy have 
the highest business ownership rates (1998) for manufacturing, while the Scandi-
navian countries and the United States have relatively low business ownership 
rates. Strong increases of the business ownership rate in manufacturing during the 
period 1970-1998 are found for Ireland, United Kingdom, United States, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand, while Denmark, France, Norway, and especially Japan 
experienced strong decreases in business ownership rates during this period. Bel-
gium, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain have the highest business ownership rates 
(1998) for services, while relatively low rates are found for the Netherlands, Swe-
den, Norway, the United States and Australia. The high proportions of self-
employed for the former five countries are partly explained by the relatively high 
numbers of unpaid family workers in these countries. According to Table 4.2 of 
OECD Employment Outlook July 1992, the proportion of unpaid family workers in 
non-agricultural civilian employment in 1990 varies from 3.4% (Belgium) to 5.4% 
(Greece) for these countries. For comparison, this proportion was 0.2% for the 
United States and Canada in 1990. Strong increases in the business ownership 
rate during the period 1970-1998 are again found for the United Kingdom, Canada 
and New Zealand, while Denmark, France and Japan also experienced strong de-
clines in business ownership rate for the service sectors.  14 
Table 1  Sectoral business ownership rates for 21 OECD countries, 1970-1984-1998 
Country Manufacturing  Services 
  1970 1984 1998 1970 1984 1998 
Austria 
b  0.051 
1976  0.044 0.040  0.166 
1976 0.141  0.138 
Belgium 
a  0.057 0.062 0.065 0.309 0.280 0.283 
Denmark 
a  0.067 0.048 0.032 0.214 0.173 0.144 
Finland 
b    0.031 0.028 0.027 0.133 0.145 0.138 
France 
a  0.062 0.049 0.041 0.238 0.171 0.138 
West-Germany 
a  0.054 0.042 0.049 0.220 0.165 0.176 
Greece 
a 0.320 
1972 0.300  0.307 0.359 
1972 0.349  0.335 
Ireland 
a 0.038  0.048  0.078  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
Italy 
a  0.139 0.155 0.164 0.425 0.459 0.437 
The Netherlands 
b  0.043 0.045 0.053 0.165 0.131 0.123 
Portugal 
a 0.056 
1974  0.051 0.055 0.365 0.324 0.381 
Spain 
a 0.089 
1972 0.123  0.123 0.411 
1972 0.398  0.314 
Sweden 
b  0.029 0.027 0.031 0.159 0.107 0.124 
United Kingdom 
a 0.019 
1972 0.033  0.059 0.133 
1972 0.150  0.158 
Iceland 
b  0.048 0.026 0.044 0.175 0.133 0.138 
Norway 
b  0.051 0.037 0.032 0.126 0.106 0.093 
United States 
a  0.022 0.030 0.037 0.117 0.114 0.103 
Japan 
b  0.153 0.120 0.070 0.265 0.200 0.137 
Canada 
b 0.029 
1976 0.032  0.040 0.097 
1976 0.105  0.130 
Australia 
b  0.039 0.051 0.089 0.119 0.131 0.123 
New Zealand 
a 0.072 
1972 0.080  0.127 0.135 
1972 0.140  0.157 
Average  0.070 0.068 0.075 0.217 0.196 0.189 
Source: “BLISS Oeso Sectoraal”. Note: business ownership rates are per total sector em-
ployment. Except for U.S., business owners include unpaid family workers. Labels 
a and 
b 
indicate that owner/managers of incorporated businesses are included (
a) or excluded (
b). In 




3.1.2 Total  employment 
 
Data on total employment (in persons) are also obtained from OECD National Ac-
counts 1983-1995 (country tables 15: employment of all persons). Total employ-
ment includes self-employed (including OMIBs and unpaid family workers) as well 
as employees. Again, where possible, missing data are obtained from other 
sources, including OECD Labour Force Statistics and the Dutch national accounts. 
 
3.1.3  Real value added 
 
Sectoral data on real value added are obtained from OECD National Accounts 
1983-1995, country tables 12: gross domestic product by kind of activity. The value 
added data are transformed into data expressed in millions of purchasing power 
parities per US $ at 1990 prices. This enables valid comparison of value added be-
tween countries and over time. Again, where possible, missing data are obtained 
from various other sources, including OECD Stan, OECD Statistical Compendium 
(on CD-ROM), and, for Portugal, unofficial statistics from the Bank of Portugal.
12  
                                                         
12 We are grateful to Jose Mata for providing us with the last-mentioned data. 15 
 
3.2  Model variables and data sources 
 
The variables incorporated in the model have the following definitions and sources. 
 
E : sectoral business ownership rate: number of business owners in sector as a 
fraction of total employment in sector. Counts of number of business owners and 
total employment are described in section 3.1. 
Y : sectoral GDP in purchasing power parities per U.S. $ in 1990 prices. This vari-
able is described in section 3.1. 
YCAP: per capita GDP in purchasing power parities per U.S. $ in 1990 prices 
(macro level). The underlying variables gross domestic product and total popula-
tion are from OECD National Accounts, Detailed Tables, and from OECD Labour 
Force Statistics, respectively. GDP is measured in constant prices. Furthermore, 
purchasing power parities of 1990 are used to make the monetary units compara-
ble between countries. 
U : (standardized) unemployment rate. This variable measures the number of un-
employed as a fraction of total labor force. The labor force consists of employees, 
self-employed persons, unpaid family workers, military and unemployed persons. 
The main source for this variable is OECD Main Economic Indicators. Some miss-
ing data on the number of unemployed have been filled up with help of data from 
the OECD Labour Force Statistics and the Yearbook of Labour Statistics from the 
International Labour Office. 
share Y _ :  sectoral GDP as fraction of macro GDP. Both sectoral GDP and 
macro GDP are taken from OECD National Accounts 1983-1995, country tables 
12: gross domestic product by kind of activity. We correct for different value added 
definitions at sectoral level in different countries, i.e., market prices, factor costs, or 
base prices. The differences result from a different statistical treatment of the items 
import duties, value added tax, and other indirect taxes. For some countries these 
items are ascribed to sectors, while for other countries, they are not. We correct for 
this by taking GDP exclusive of these three items (i.e., the item ‘Subtotal’) as de-
nominator of  share Y _ . 
WT ∆ : growth of world trade (yearly basis). These data are taken from Appendix A4 
(“Kerngegevens 1970-2002”) of the publication Central Economic Plan (CEP) 
2001, item “relevante wereldhandel”, by CPB Netherlands’ Bureau for Economic 
Policy Analysis. 
ITA D : dummy for Italy: this variable has value one for Italy, and zero otherwise. 
OMIB D : dummy for countries defining the number of business owners inclusive of 
owner/managers of incorporated businesses (OMIBs): this variable gets value one 
for the countries Belgium through New Zealand (as mentioned in section 3.1.1), 





The current section is split up in two parts. In the first part we present separate re-
sults for manufacturing and services. We also discuss the methods employed to 
compute the regression models. In the second part we present a model where 
business ownership rates in manufacturing and services, as well as sector struc-16 
ture are assumed to simultaneously explain growth at the macro level (growth of 
GDP per capita). 
 
4.1  Methods and sector results 
 
Equations (1) and (2) are estimated successively. For a given specification of 
* E   
(equation 3a, 3b, 3c or 3d), we substitute the expression into equation (1). This 
leads to an expression which is nonlinear in the parameters. Therefore we esti-
mate the regression equation using non-linear least squares.
13 After having esti-
mated equation (1), we are able to compute 
* E , and hence  E E −
* , using the pa-
rameter estimates of the equilibrium function (3). After computing  E E −
* , we are 
able to estimate equation (2), using OLS.  
When estimating the model, we weight observations with population. We consider 
larger countries such as the U.S. and Japan to be more important in establishing 
the relationship between business ownership and economic growth than small 
countries like New Zealand and Iceland. Weighting with population (in the year t-4) 
implies that all variables (including constants and dummies) are multiplied with the 
square root of population before the least squares procedure is run. A more de-
tailed description of the weighting of observations can be found in Carree et al. 
(2002, p. 286). Both for manufacturing and services, the regressions are computed 
using unbalanced panels. This is caused by missing data for certain countries and 
years in our sectoral data base. Furthermore, as in Carree et al., uneven years are 
removed.
14 Our sample contains 245 observations for the manufacturing sector and 
231 observations for services. For the exact construction of these samples we re-
fer to the appendix. The estimation results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
 
                                                         
13 We use the LSQ command in TSP 4.5. 
14
 The removal of uneven years has the advantage of diminishing the potential danger of a downward bias 
in the estimated standard errors of the coefficients that may arise due to overlapping observation periods 
for consecutive years. The key variables like business ownership rate and GDP per capita change only 
slowly over time. Hence, it is unlikely that the results will alter much in case the uneven years would have 
been included. 17 
Table 2  Estimation results model (1)-(2)-(3) MANUFACTURING (245 observations) 
Eq. (1)+(3), dependent variable four-year growth of sectoral business ownership rate 
 Quadratic  Inverse  Log-quadratic  Log-inverse 
















Sectoral GDP share 















































adj R   0.302 0.305 0.302 0.305 
LR Test  0 = δ  
(5% critical value 3.84) 
0.076 0.118 
LR Test  0 = =γ β  
(5% critical value 5.99) 
0.056 0.117 
 
Eq. (2), dependent variable four-year growth of sectoral GDP 








Deviation E from E* 
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World tr., 2 year lag 









World tr., 4 year lag 










adj R   0.446 0.450 0.449 0.449 
 
EXTRA: Test of robustness  
Deviation E from E* 


















adj R   0.612 0.615 0.614 0.615 
Note: T-values in parentheses. The extra equation uses the same control variables as equation (2). 18 
Table 3  Estimation results model (1)-(2)-(3) SERVICES (231 observations) 
Eq. (1)+(3), dependent variable four-year growth of sectoral business ownership rate 
 Quadratic  Inverse  Log-quadratic  Log-inverse 
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adj R   0.402 0.385 0.398 0.377 
LR Test  0 = δ   
(5% critical value 3.84) 
0.369 3.33 
LR Test  0 = =γ β  
(5% critical value 5.99) 
7.02 12.2 
 
Eq. (2), dependent variable four-year growth of sectoral GDP 








Deviation E from E* 
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World tr., 2 year lag 









World tr., 4 year lag 










adj R   0.788 0.783 0.786 0.782 
 
EXTRA: Test of robustness  
Deviation E from E* 


















adj R   0.819 0.817 0.818 0.817 
Note: T-values in parentheses. The extra equation uses the same control variables as equation (2). 19 
Equilibrium equation (3) 
In Tables 2 and 3 estimation results are given for the four different specifications of 
the sectoral equilibrium rate of business ownership (3a)-(3d). Based on likelihood 
ratio tests we try to identify which specification fits the data best. To test the quad-
ratic specification versus the inverse specification, we estimate an additional equa-
tion (1), where the equilibrium function is now specified as 
) YCAP /( YCAP YCAP YCAP E it it it it
*
ijt 1
2 + + + + = δ γ β α . The quadratic and inverse specifica-
tions are special cases of this (artificial) function: the quadratic equilibrium function 
corresponds to  0 = δ , while the inverse specification corresponds to  0 = =γ β . In 
other words, the quadratic and inverse models are nested in the model and, hence, 
standard likelihood ratio tests apply. This holds analogously for the log-quadratic 
versus the log-inverse model. The LR test statistics are given in the tables. 
For  manufacturing both null hypotheses  0 = δ  and  0 = =γ β  cannot be rejected. 
This means that U-shaped equilibrium functions cannot be distinguished from L-
shaped functions in a statistical sense. The inverse specification has the highest 
adjusted R
2 values, although the differences are small. The implied asymptotic 
value of 0.04 for this specification seems plausible. For services the likelihood ratio 
tests point in the direction of a U-shape: the null hypothesis  0 = δ  is not rejected 
while the null hypothesis  0 = =γ β  is. This holds for both types of comparisons: 
quadratic versus inverse and log-quadratic versus log-inverse. So, after having 
reached a minimum level, the business ownership rate starts to rise again with in-
creasing wealth (i.e., increasing GDP per capita). For the quadratic specification, 
the minimum  γ β 2 / −  is reached at 18,129 U.S. dollar (1990 prices). The minimum 
business ownership rate equals 0.099. Based on this analysis, we will discuss the 
other estimation results for the specifications with the best statistical fit: L-shape 




From Tables 2 and 3 we see that error-correction processes are statistically sig-
nificant for both manufacturing and services. However, the speed of adjustment is 
low: 16% for services and 9% for manufacturing. A speed of adjustment of 16% 
means that a deviation of the number of business owners from equilibrium at a cer-
tain point in time decreases with 16% in the succeeding four years. The low value 
of the speed of adjustment is not surprising. The convergence process of the ac-
tual business ownership rate towards the equilibrium rate is intrinsically slow be-
cause it involves structural changes on the supply side (setting up enterprises, in-
vestments in physical and human capital, divestments, etc.) as well as cultural and 
institutional changes. As some of these processes are especially slow in manufac-
turing, the lower speed of adjustment for this sector compared to services is not 
surprising. For instance, it is more difficult to start a business in the manufacturing 
sector than in the service sector, because on average more start-up capital is re-
quired.   
We find evidence for the unemployment push hypothesis. For services, every per-
cent point rise in the unemployment rate leads to a rise of 0.11 percent point in the 
self-employment rate in the succeeding four years. For manufacturing this effect is 
0.06 percent point. Again, the smaller effect for manufacturing may be explained 
by higher set-up costs for starting a new business. A significantly negative sign of 
sectoral GDP share (parameter  3 b ) is found only in case of the manufacturing sec-20 
tor. High shares of manufacturing in a country’s economy are associated with sub-
sequently lower business ownership rates. This may reflect the importance of 
economies of scale in manufacturing.  
The estimated correction factor for the number of OMIBs,  OMIB b , is plausible, both 
for manufacturing and services. In the equilibrium functions, the number of OMIBs 
as a proportion of other self-employed (unincorporated self-employed and unpaid 
family workers) equals 0.28 and 0.13 for manufacturing and services, respectively. 
The additional (unexplained) rise in business ownership for Italy is supported by 
our estimations: parameter  ITA b  is significantly positive. The effect is much stronger 
for services though: the parameter is about five times higher for services compared 
to manufacturing.  
 
Equation (2) 
According to the significantly negative estimate of  1 c , deviations between actual 
and equilibrium business ownership rates come at a cost of forgone growth. The 
effect is stronger for manufacturing than for services. Each percent point difference 
between  E  and 
* E  is associated with a loss of 0.5 percent point subsequent 
growth in value added (on a four year basis) in manufacturing. For services this ef-
fect is only 0.1 percent point. This suggests that deviating from the “optimal” firm 
size distribution is more important for manufacturing when compared to services. 
Either having too few or too many entrepreneurial ventures in manufacturing ap-
pears to be more damaging to economic performance than when this occurs in the 
service sector. When there are too few entrepreneurs this may come at the cost of 
the rate of radical innovations and consequently, economic growth. When there are 
too many entrepreneurs economies of scale may not be benefited from enough. In 
Figures 1 and 2 it is shown that for manufacturing the number of business owners 
is generally too low (consistent with a lack of incentives to innovate), while for ser-
vices the number of business owners is generally too high. The latter observation 
implies that in many countries there are a lot of ‘marginal’ entrepreneurs, whose 
efforts and energy could be allocated more effectively working as wage earners. 
This is especially true for Italy. 
The estimations also find evidence for the convergence of countries: GDP per cap-
ita has a negative impact on subsequent growth (parameter  2 c ), although the effect 
is significant only for services. For manufacturing there is a regression-to-the-mean 
effect: the parameter of sectoral GDP-share ( 3 c ) is significantly negative. For ser-
vices the latter effect is not found. Finally, we find a significant positive impact of 
the growth of world trade on sectoral growth. Looking at the combined effect (the 
sum of parameters  4 c ,  5 c  and  6 c ) the effect is larger for manufacturing. Again, this 
is not surprising, given the bigger orientation on export in this sector. 
 
Test of robustness 
As a test of robustness, we also estimated the sector growth equation with em-
ployment growth included as an extra explanatory variable. See the last parts of 
Tables 2 and 3. Note that, by and large, we thus measure labour productivity 
growth instead of production growth. Although t-values become lower, the esti-
mates of  1 c  (growth penalty) remain negative. This gives us some confidence 
about the robustness of the growth penalty. The coefficient of employment growth 
7 c  is smaller than one, which suggests decreasing returns to scale. However, this 
is not necessarily the case. As employment is measured in persons, the low coeffi-21 
cient may reflect a relative increase in part-time workers (compared to full-time 
workers). This phenomenon may be stronger for services, considering the low 




In Figures 1 and 2, we show the equilibrium curves and the actual data for the G7-
countries. For the equilibrium curves we choose the specification with the best sta-
tistical fit: “Inverse” for manufacturing and “Quadratic” for services. For manufactur-
ing, all G7-countries –except for Italy- are well below the “equilibrium” rate.
15 Ac-
cording to the significant negative parameter estimate of  1 c  in equation (2), these 
deviations from equilibrium are penalised in the form of lower growth rates. So, ap-
parently, there are too few self-employed in the manufacturing industries. Perhaps 
the low numbers of competitors and new entrepreneurial initiatives result in a lack 
of innovation incentives and therefore, in lower growth rates. Japan and Italy have 
been relatively close to the equilibrium curve. According to our model, the relatively 
high business ownership rate for manufacturing in these countries has favoured 
economic growth.  
                                                         
15 In Van Stel and Carree (2002) we provide additional empirical evidence for the validity of the equilib-
rium curve depicted in Figure 1. In particular, we show that allowing for country-specific (hence lower) 
equilibrium functions is unattractive, both statistically and theoretically. We find no growth penalty any 
more because structural differences between countries are removed and only time-specific deviations are left. 22 
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Note: Actual and equilibrium business ownership rates are per total sector employment. 
Business owners include unpaid family workers and owner/managers of incorporated 
businesses. Equilibrium rate according to “Inverse” specification in Table 2. Data for Ja-
pan and Canada are raised by the estimated factor  ) 1 ( OMIB b + =1.281 to facilitate valid 
comparison of E  and 
* E . Per capita income YCAP expressed in purchasing power pari-




Contrary to manufacturing, the business ownership rates in most of the G7-
countries are above equilibrium for services, the United States being the exception. 
The U-curved equilibrium function, which was clearly preferred over an L-shape, 
does not show in the actual business ownership rate data for the G7-countries. 
Only the United Kingdom and Canada have increasing business ownership rates. 
Note, however, that most countries still have levels of GDP per capita correspond-
ing to the decreasing part of the curve. That is, they did not yet reach the per cap-
ita income corresponding to the minimum level of the parabola. For services, the 
business ownership rate of Italy lies far above equilibrium. The extremely low scale 
of operations in Italian service industries appears clearly sub-optimal. It suggests 




                                                         
16 Note that the large distance from equilibrium for Italy (Figure 2) is consistent with the high value of the 
Italy-dummy in Table 3, while the small distance from equilibrium for manufacturing (Figure 1) is consis-
tent with the low value of the Italy-dummy in Table 2. 23 
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Note: Actual and equilibrium business ownership rates are per total sector employment. 
Business owners include unpaid family workers and owner/managers of incorporated 
businesses. Equilibrium rate according to “Quadratic” specification in Table 3. Data for Ja-
pan and Canada are raised by the estimated factor  ) 1 ( OMIB b + =1.130 to facilitate valid 
comparison of E  and 
* E . Per capita income YCAP expressed in purchasing power pari-
ties per U.S. $ at 1990 prices. 
 
 
4.2  Effect on macro growth 
 
In the previous sections we analysed the relationship between business ownership 
and economic growth for manufacturing and services separately. We related devia-
tions between the actual business ownership rate  E  and the equilibrium or optimal 
business ownership rate 
* E  in one sector to value added growth of that same sec-
tor. In this section we look at the effect of deviations at the sectoral level to growth 
at the macro level. In this way we can determine whether deviations in one sector 
are more harmful to growth than deviations in another sector. We also consider 
(deviations from the average) sector structure as a possible determinant of eco-
nomic growth at the macro level. In Table 4 we report the sector shares of manu-
facturing and services in economy-wide GDP for the 21 countries in our data set, 
for three years in the period 1970-1998. 24 
Table 4  Sector share in total economy (GDP) for 21 OECD countries, 1970-1984-1998 
Country Manufacturing  Services 
  1970 1984 1998 1970 1984 1998 
Austria
  0.23 0.23 0.23 0.40 0.46 0.49 
Belgium 0.22  0.23  0.21  0.52 
1976  0.52 0.54 
Denmark  0.20 0.21 0.17 0.46 0.44 0.45 
Finland    0.22 0.23 0.29 0.34 0.37 0.38 
France  0.25 0.24 0.22 0.41 0.47 0.51 
West-Germany 0.38  0.33  0.27 
1996 0.35  0.41 0.50 
1996 
Greece  0.17 0.17 0.14 0.37 0.41 0.47 
Ireland 0.19 
1976 0.21 0.30 
1994 N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
Italy  0.18 0.21 0.22 0.42 0.47 0.50 
The  Netherlands 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.48 0.52 0.57 
Portugal  0.21 0.23 0.26 0.48 0.43 0.48 
Spain  0.23 0.23 0.21 N.A.  0.49 
1986 0.50 
Sweden  0.24 0.23 0.25 0.37 0.39 0.42 
United  Kingdom  0.30 0.23 0.20 0.45 0.46 0.53 
Iceland 0.23 
1980 0.20  0.16 0.39 
1980 0.42  0.44 
Norway  0.23 0.15 0.11 0.49 0.46 0.44 
United States  0.20  0.18  0.22 
1996 0.48  0.56 0.59 
1996 
Japan  0.26 0.26 0.27 0.42 0.48 0.53 
Canada  0.20 0.19 0.18 0.38 0.44 0.48 
Australia 0.18 
1974  0.16 0.13 0.60 0.63 0.68 
New Zealand  0.21 
1978 0.22  0.18 0.51 
1978 0.50  0.55 
Average  *  0.23 0.22 0.21 0.44 0.47 0.50 
Source: EIM, based on OECD. Note: When 1970 or 1998 data are not available, the earliest 
or the most recent year available in the data set, are reported. *Excluding Ireland and Spain. 
 
 
The average sector structure 
In order to investigate the effect of sector structure on economic growth we intro-
duce the concept of an average sector structure. Like the sectoral equilibrium 
business ownership rate equations (3), we choose a specification in which sector 
structure is dependent on GDP per capita. Because the two sectors manufacturing 
and services comprise almost all economic activity in most countries, we simply 
use GDP share of services in a country’s total GDP as indicator of sector structure. 
We choose a log-linear specification for the average sector structure function:   
 
(4)  () it it t , services , i YCAP ln share _ Y 3 1 ε η ς + + + = , 
 
where  share Y _  and YCAP are as defined in section 2, and  3 ε  is a disturbance term. 
It is well-known that the share of services in an economy rises with GDP per cap-
ita. Hence, the expected sign of η is positive. As parameter ς  is interpreted as the 
share of services when per capita income equals zero, this parameter should also 
be positive. Equation (4) is estimated as a separate equation (again using 
weighted least squares) and residuals are interpreted as deviations from the aver-
age sector structure.
17 Next, the absolute values of the residuals are inserted in the 
                                                         
17 Because equation (4) is estimated separately (i.e., not in an error-correction type of equation like (1)), 
the estimated function should not be interpreted as an equilibrium, but rather as an average. 25 
macro growth equation as an independent variable. Like deviating from an equilib-
rium business ownership rate, it could be the case that deviating from an average 
sector structure may hamper economic growth.
18 However, this is far from certain 
because countries might also benefit from “specialization”. 
For our macro growth equation we use the equilibrium relations with the best sta-
tistical fit found in section 4.1: inverse for manufacturing and quadratic for services. 
Next we estimate equation (4), to obtain a function for the average industry struc-
ture. Finally, the variables thus obtained (deviations for sectoral business owner-
ship rates and industry structure) are used as independent variables in the macro 
growth equation. This equation reads as follows. 
 
(5) 
ijt t t t
t , i t , serv , i t , serv , i
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where the subscripts manuf and serv stand for manufacturing and services, re-
spectively, and where the variable 
* _share Y  is formed by the fitted values of equa-
tion (4). Equation (5) is chosen such that results of our macro growth equation are 
comparable to the sector results presented earlier. In equation (5) we explain 
macro-economic growth (growth of GDP per capita) from deviations between ac-
tual and equilibrium business ownership rate in both manufacturing and services. 
Furthermore we include deviations from the average industry structure as an inde-
pendent variable. Results are presented in Table 5. 
In Table 5, the results of the first estimated equation are taken from Tables 2 and 
3. Based on these equilibrium functions, deviations between actual and equilibrium 
business ownership rates are calculated. These deviation variables are used in the 
third estimated equation, along with the deviation from the average industry struc-
ture (residuals of equation (4)). The estimation results of this latter equation are 
also in Table 5. The statistical fit of the average sectoral GDP-share of services is 
high with an adjusted R
2 of 0.979. The estimated share of services in macro-GDP 
rises with per capita income as η is estimated to be positive. 
 
                                                         
18 Empirical evidence of the impact of sectoral composition on economic growth can be found in Fagerberg (2000) 
and Carree (2003). They find evidence of countries which have a relatively large or growing share of the electron-
ics industry to show relatively high subsequent productivity growth in manufacturing. 26 
Table 5  Estimation results model (1)-(3)-(4)-(5) MACRO LEVEL 
Eq. (1)+(3), dependent variable four-year growth of sectoral business ownership rate 
 Manufacturing:  inverse  case, 
(245 observations) 
Services: quadratic case, 
(231 observations) 








Sectoral GDP share 





















γ    0.0014 
(4.04) 
2
adj R   0.305 0.402 
 
Eq. (4), dependent variable GDP-share services in macro-GDP (227 observations) 
ς   0.011 
(0.32) 
η   0.171 
(13.6) 
2
adj R   0.979 
 
Eq. (5), dependent variable four-year growth of GDP per capita (227 observations) 
Constant ( 0 c )  0.307 
(3.96) 
Deviation E from E*, 
manufacturing ( 1 c ) 
-0.248 
(-1.03) 
Deviation E from E*, 
services ( 2 c ) 
-0.150 
(-0.99) 
Deviation from ‘optimal’ 
industry structure ( 3 c ) 
-0.329 
(-1.04) 
GDP per capita ( 4 c )  -0.011 
(-3.64) 
World trade ( 5 c )  -0.444 
(-1.22) 
World tr., 2 year lag 
( 6 c ) 
-0.024 
(-0.067) 
World tr., 4 year lag 




adj R   0.100 
Note: T-values in parentheses. Estimations of equations (4) and (5) include all observations for which data of 
manufacturing and services are simultaneously available. 
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Estimation of the macro growth equation (5) results in negative parameter esti-
mates for all three deviation variables. However, absolute t-values are around 
one.
19 Although they are not significantly different from zero, the fact that all three 
coefficients are negative provides an indication that deviating from equilibrium 
business ownership rates or average sector structure might have a negative im-
pact on per capita income growth. Of course, they are no more than indications 





In this paper we investigate the development of business ownership (self-
employment) rates over time and the effect of business ownership on economic 
growth, both at the sectoral level. In an earlier exercise, Carree et al. (2002) pre-
sented a two-equation model to analyze the interrelationship between economy-
wide business ownership rates and economic development. They apply the model 
to a data set of 23 OECD-countries for the period 1976-96. The paper showed em-
pirical evidence for a (slow) error-correction process for business ownership rates: 
countries with business ownership rates more or less than the "equilibrium" value 
for the specific stage of economic development of these countries showed, on av-
erage, convergence towards the "equilibrium". In addition, it was found that the 
"equilibrium" relationship between business ownership rate and stage of economic 
development (as proxied by GDP per capita) was declining for the larger part of the 
range of GDP per capita but had the tendency to rise for the highest levels of GDP 
per capita. The study also provided evidence that countries that had an out-of-
equilibrium value of business ownership rate suffered in terms of economic growth 
foregone.  
The analysis performed by Carree et al. (2002) raises an important research ques-
tion: to what extent do differences in business ownership at the economy-wide 
level reflect differences in the sectoral structures of economies or differences in 
business ownership rates at the sectoral level? It is well known that the average 
business ownership rate in the service sector is much higher than that in the manu-
facturing sector. Data in the current paper show that the average rate (including 
unpaid family workers) for OECD-countries was almost 20% in 1984 for the service 
sector, while it was less than 7% for the manufacturing sector. This has important 
consequences for the analysis previously performed. The tendency of business 
ownership rates to increase may be due just to a shift of economic activity from the 
manufacturing sector towards the service sector in the course of economic devel-
opment. As a consequence, the penalty found for deviating from the "equilibrium" 
value of (economy-wide) business ownership may really be a penalty for deviating 
from a certain structural composition of the economy. This study investigates the 
"equilibrium" relationship between business ownership rates and economic devel-
opment, the speed of the error-correction process and the existence (and severity) 
of the growth penalty when deviating from "equilibrium" for both the manufacturing 
sector and the service sector for the OECD-countries in the period 1970-98. 
The paper develops an adjusted two-equation model relating business ownership 
rates and economic growth rates at the sectoral level. Specific attention in the 
                                                         
19 This is not caused by multicollinearity as mutual correlations between the three variables are low. 28 
model is paid to whether national statistical agencies have reported to include 
owner/managers of incorporated business into the data. Four different types of 
"equilibrium" relations between business ownership rate and GDP per capita are 
investigated, two of which have a U-shape (first declining and then rising owner-
ship rates) and two of which have an L-shape (ownership rates continuously de-
clining towards an asymptotic minimum rate). We have collected data for 21 
OECD-countries for the years 1970-1998, as far as the data were available accord-
ing to uniform definitions. The data show that, on average for OECD-countries, 
business ownership rates in manufacturing have been largely stable at 7%, while 
they have, on average, been decreasing for the service sector from 22% in 1970 to 
19% in 1998. However, in several important industrial economies such as the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia, business ownership in 
manufacturing has gone up. Ownership rates in manufacturing remain lower than 
ownership rates in services though. This confirms that at least part of the increase 
in the economy-wide share of business ownership is due to the sectoral shift to-
wards the service sector in developed economies. 
Results show that the empirical fit of the four different types of "equilibrium" rela-
tionships is not too different, both for the case of manufacturing and that of ser-
vices. However, results for the speed of error-correction are hardly affected by 
which type is chosen. The estimated speed of error-correction for the manufactur-
ing sector is about 8.5% for a four-year period. This estimated speed is twice as 
high in the service sector: about 16%. Both in the manufacturing sector and for 
services there is a positive effect of (lagged) unemployment: countries with high 
unemployment show higher subsequent business ownership rates both in manu-
facturing and services. The results show that there is a significant penalty of the 
business ownership rate deviating from "equilibrium" for manufacturing for each of 
the four types of the "equilibrium" relationship. For the service sector also a nega-
tive effect on growth is found, but it is not always significant and it is far smaller 
than that for manufacturing. 
The analysis confirms the empirical evidence provided by Carree et al. (2002) that 
differences in business ownership rates matter and disappear over time slowly. 
The general idea behind the model is that there can be both too many and too few 
businesses. Too many businesses may mean that economies of scale and scope 
are not benefitted enough from and that there are probably many "marginal" ven-
tures. Too few business may imply that there is not enough entrepreneurial activity.  
The results presented in the current paper make a contribution to the international 
debate on increasing entrepreneurship as a route to economic growth. For in-
stance, one of the major objectives of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor re-
search program is to gain more insight in the systematic relationship between en-
trepreneurship and national economic growth (Reynolds et al. 2002). Based on 
correlation analysis of nation-wide measures of entrepreneurship and economic 
growth, Reynolds et al. (2002) state that “evidence continues to accumulate that 
the national level of entrepreneurial activity has a statistically significant associa-
tion with subsequent levels of economic growth” (p. 6). 
The current analysis shows that entrepreneurial activity as far as embodied in self-
employment rates may benefit economic growth, but is not always a route to 
growth. Our analysis suggests not only that economies can have too few or too 
many businesses, but also that the extent to which there are too many or too few 
businesses varies by sector. In particular, the estimated equilibrium curves suggest 
that having too few businesses is the more likely problem in manufacturing, while 29 
having too many businesses is the more likely problem in the service sector. It 
would suggest that, not only, the economic benefits of government promoting new 
(and small) business may be country-specific, but also sector-specific. Such pro-
motion seems most beneficial in the manufacturing sector of countries with very 
low business ownership rates (like the Scandinavian countries). It may be counter-
productive to have similar promotion in the service sector of countries with very 
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Appendix Data  availability 
 
The various estimations in the present paper were performed using data from the 
data base “BLISS Oeso Sectoraal”. As this is an unbalanced panel, different num-
bers of observations per country are used for different estimations. The exact data 
per country used in the various estimations are reported in this appendix.  
 
In Table A1 the construction of the estimation samples used for the various estima-
tions in this report is given. For manufacturing, there are 245 observations in total, 
and for services 231 (see Tables 2, 3 and 5). The maximum number of observa-
tions for a country is 13 (1974-98; only even years).
20 For countries having less 
than 13 observations the exact years available are reported in the table. 
 
Table A1: Number of observations per country used for sector estimations 
Country Manufacturing  Services 
Austria  10      (1980-98)  10      (1980-98) 
Belgium  13  10      (1980-98) 
Denmark 13  13 
Finland 13  13 
France 13  13 
West-Germany 13  13 
Greece  12     (1976-98)  12     (1976-98) 
Ireland    8     (1980-94)  - 
Italy 13  13 
The Netherlands  13  13 
Portugal  11     (1978-98)  13 
Spain  12     (1976-98)    5     (1990-98) 
Sweden 13  13 
United Kingdom  12     (1976-98)  12     (1976-98) 
Iceland    8     (1984-98)    8     (1984-98) 
Norway 13  13 
United States  12     (1974-96)  12     (1974-96) 
Japan 13  13 
Canada  10     (1980-98)  10     (1980-98) 
Australia  11     (1978-98)  13 
New Zealand    9     (1982-98)    9     (1982-98) 
TOTAL 245  231 
Note: Maximum number of observations is 13 (1974-98). 
 
As we saw in Table 5, the number of observations used for the macro estimations 
is 227. This number is obtained by taking the intersection of the manufacturing and 
services samples. In Table A1, compared to the services sample of 231 observa-
tions, only for Portugal and Australia there are missing observations for manufac-
turing (viz. 1974 and 1976, for both countries).  
                                                         
20 Note that in these cases the actual number of available years is 15 (1970-98), due to the four-year lag 
in the model. 